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Book Reviews and Notices
J. Regier, L. Randone, J. P. Marjanen, S. Gino, E. Pasini
Reviews and Notices of Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Re-
naissance: Reception, Legacy, Transformation, Brill 2014; Gentilcore, Food and
Health in Early Modern Europe: Diet, Medicine and Society, 1450-1800, Blooms-
bury 2015; Whatmore, What is Intellectual History?, Polity 2016; Apel, Feverish
Bodies, Enlightened Minds: Science and the Yellow Fever Controversy in the
Early American Republic, Stanford UP 2016; Hill Collins and Bilge, Intersection-
ality, Polity 2016; Weeks, What is Sexual History?, Polity 2016.
1 Pietro Daniel Omodeo,Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renais-sance: Reception, Legacy, Transformation, Leiden: Brill, 2014, p. xiv+434.ISBN 9789004251786, €159,00.Copernicus occupies a place of privilege inmodern history of science. Alexan-
dre Koyré made his astronomy the instigator of the Scientific Revolution. And
before Thomas Kuhn wrote about scientific revolutions in the plural, he wrote
about the Copernican Revolution in the singular. The Copernican Revolution,
said Kuhn, was in its scientific impact like other important theories and unlike
most of them in its effects outside of scientific communities. In its wider social
consequences, he noted, it compared to the revolutions of Darwin, Freud and
Einstein.¹ But Copernicus the individual was less important to his revolution
¹ Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western
Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 4.
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas 5(2016), 10, p. 5:1–5:21. Non peer-reviewed.
than those three to theirs. Copernicus died the same year as the publication of
De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (1543). Rheticus, his one disciple, wrote a
treatise called the Narratio prima (1540) with ideas that are not found in the
De revolutionibus, but we do not know if they were his ideas or his master’s.
The Copernican Revolution, as both Koyré and Kuhn recognized, is very much
a story of reception. Over the last fifty years, a formidable body of historical
work has emerged on Copernicus, his adopters and critics. A recent tome by
Robert Westman and the critical storm it generated show that Copernicus and
his reception remain relevant not only as historical subjects but also as subjects
who can make us question how history of science should be practiced.¹
Pietro Daniel Omodeo’s new book, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the
Renaissance: Reception, Legacy, Transformation, is a welcome addition to the lit-
erature. It is a book that we have long needed, particularly as a concentrated
response to Pierre Duhem’s Sauver les apparences, a slim volume from 1908
that continues to exert great influence over how we read Renaissance astron-
omy and celestial philosophy. Astronomy from the Greeks until Newton was,
for Duhem, marked by extreme tension between those who considered astro-
nomical hypotheses as predictive instruments and those who thought they had
to represent physical reality. The former camp was in the right, according to
Duhem; the latter camp was deluded but sometimes useful for how it pushed
fundamental science forward. In Duhem’s narrative, Copernicus was a realist
under the spell of Averroists centered at the University of Padua.
Copernic conçoit le problème astronomique comme le conçoivent les physiciens italiens
dont il a été l’auditeur ou le condisciple ; ce problème consiste à sauver les apparences
au moyen d’hypothèses conformes aux principes de la Physique. […].²
Duhem’s approach has been qualified andmodified over the intervening cen-
tury, yet it has proven extremely fruitful. It remains the major historiograph-
ical filter among historians of Renaissance astronomy. I would suggest that
Omodeo’s book demonstrates for once and all that pure instrumentalism never
existed among astronomers. Everybody had some dog in the race. An accurate
¹ Robert S. Westman, The Copernican Question: Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011). For the ensuing debate between
Westman, Noel Swerdlow, and John Heilbron, see Perspectives on Science 20, no. 3, and 21, no. 1.
² Pierre Duhem, Sauver Les Apparences (Paris: Vrin, 2004 [1908]), 21.
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historiography of the Copernican reception should, instead, consider priori-
ties. What were the physical and mathematical priorities of astronomers and
philosophers responding to or adopting Copernicus? When and how did they
invoke what we might now call instrumentalism? What was the relation be-
tween those priorities and wider questions about the capacities and limits of
human reason? Omodeo’s work is not the first to recognize that sixteenth cen-
tury astronomers were essentially “frustrated realists” in the words of Barker
and Goldstein.¹ However, it is a comprehensive and systematic answer to the
above questions as they relate to Copernican astronomy.
Omodeo considers a rich selection of actors in a variety of contexts, and he
moves from actor to actor with precision and verve, keeping his chapters the-
matically focused. One of the most attractive features of his book is that it cov-
ers a wide geographical range: Germany, France, Italy, and England receive
the most attention. Omodeo is chiefly concerned with how Copernican sym-
pathizers justified themselves and with how their antagonists set boundaries
on astronomy. One of the book’s virtues is to ask what practically minded as-
tronomers thought about the status of astronomical knowledge. For instance,
chapter three looks at how ephemerists used Copernican astronomy and what
they had to say about the nature of astronomical knowledge. Omodeo is an
expert on Lutheran mathematical networks. Another highlight of his study is
its clear overview of the Lutheran “Wittenberg interpretation” of Copernicus,
which reworked Copernican techniques in a geocentric framework. If there is
one personage who stands out in Omodeo’s study, and who stands apart, it
is Giordano Bruno. Once again, Bruno comes across as perhaps the most vi-
tal, audacious and creative of sixteenth century philosophers. Omodeo is to be
commended for his fascinating treatment of the Nolan, which shows to what
extent Bruno’s anti-Christian views of truth and goodness link up with his cos-
mological beliefs. Cardinal Bellarmine, who directed Bruno’s inquisition and
was a hero of Duhem’s Sauver les apparances, emerges as a facile thinker, offer-
ing nothing of substance to astronomers and philosophers except an injunction
to hew close enough to Vatican doctrine.
Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance will prove a highly use-
¹ Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century As-
tronomy: A Reappraisal,” Perspectives on Science 6, no. 3 (1998): 232–58, 253.
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ful study for scholars working in sixteenth century astronomy and natural phi-
losophy. They will discover new actors and thematic connections. Because of
its scope, clarity and comprehensiveness, Omodeo’s volume will also pay div-
idends to graduate students, and to historians of science working on outside
subjects, who wish to understand the epistemological stakes of astronomy in
the sixteenth century.
Jonathan Regier
2 David Gentilcore, Food andHealth in EarlyModern Europe: Diet, Medicineand Society, 1450-1800, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 264. ISBN 1472528891,£ 14.29 (eBook). ISBN 9781472534972, £ 25.99 (paperback).Both individuals and states seem to be afflicted by food anxieties.Thismodern
obsession with diet reflects the link that, since Hippocrates’s time, men have
established between food and health, asking the following questions: what is
food? What does food produce in the body? How does the stomach function?
What influence does diet have on the expression of one’s own ability? In Food
and Health in Early Modern Europe David Gentilcore traces the history of this
link, investigating the medical theories and the social and cultural factors that
gradually led to a definition of foods as being healthy or not.
The interdisciplinary approach is intriguing. Dealing with the question of
nutritive values, Gentilcore draws together two strands: the history of food,
wherein interest has shifted from the 1960s to the present day from food pro-
duction and consumption to the cultural, religious and politics aspects of it;
together with the history of medicine, the study of which has seen a stunning
increase in popularity over the last thirty years. Gentilcore, however, does not
limit himself to examining the general connections between food and medical
theories. Instead, he follows the path sketched by the historian Andrew Wear,
who, in Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine¹, reserves a whole chap-
ter to preventive medicine and the importance of medical counsel. Focusing on
food as an element of preventive medicine, the author attempts to put two sub-
disciplines, the social history of medicine and the study of the learned medical
¹ A. Wear, Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine 1550-1680 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000).
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discourse, next to one other, avoiding the gap between the evolution of theory
and medical practices that the success of these disciplines has created.
In the first part (chap. 1-2) the author looks at how the question of the health-
iness of food, and cooking in a healthy manner, was influenced by medical the-
ories.
In the middle of the Fifteenth Century, the revival of preventive medicine,
thanks to the rescue of Galen’s De sanitate tuenda and De alimentorum facul-
tatibus, was characterized by a focus on food and individual constitution. Ac-
cording to the Galenic perspective, both body and food are governed by four
fluids, or humours. Since each person is born with a prevalent humour (the so
called complexio which is predisposed to specific diseases), the maintenance of
one’s health consists in an accurate diagnosis of the humours and a tailor-made
regimen that balances the fluids predominant in the body with the opposite flu-
ids in foods (for example, lettuce, which was not considered a proper food, but
just a condiment, was recommended to people of ‘hot’ complexion). Since the
stomach was considered a sort of perpetually boiling pot and digestion a form
of cooking (‘concoction’), preference was given to those foods that foster the
action of the stomach, such as hot and well-cooked foods, or bread, which was
considered a sort of glue that aids the digestive process.
Starting from the middle of the Seventeenth Century, more universal phys-
iologies elaborated by Paracelsian and iatromechanical physicians called the
idea that everybody is unique into question, and Gentilcore skilfully describes
how dietary advice gradually transformed from detailed recommendations to
general counsel about prudent and measured consumption. At the same time,
new understandings of food and the digestive process gradually shaped new
conceptions of diet. Food, in addition to its evermore frequent classification
along chemical lines (particularly after the publication of Louis Lémery’s Traité
des aliments in 1775), slowly ceased to be determined by the constitution of the
individual and became a question of personal taste. And a new understanding
of the action of the stomach, which was now understood to break food up via
mechanical processes, ferments or stomach acid, supported the idea of a lighter
diet (in 1755, for example, the physician Jacques-Jean Bruhier suggested that
fruit and oysters could be eaten raw).
Although the emphasis on preventive medicine had given way to the idea
that treatment depended on drug therapies, dietetics didn’t suddenly collapse,
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and the author shows how its structure remained Galenic, albeit with the lan-
guage of the fluids replaced by that of chemical constituents and/or mechanical
processes. For example, George Cheyne, in his Essay of Health and Long Life
(1724), was original in defining a healthy body as one in which juices circu-
late freely through tubes and in prescribing a light diet that avoids obstructions
caused by fatty and oily foods. Yet his treatise still holds a traditional struc-
ture: it is dedicated to a specific class of people, i.e. educated gentlemen, and
focuses on the maintenance of health with regards to the regulation of the six
non-naturals (air, motion and rest, sleep and waking, food and drink, excretion,
passions).
According to Gentilcore, the substantial change occurred starting from the
middle of the Eighteenth Century. At this point there was a resurgence of
interest in preventive medicine, but now in a more comprehensive manner,
which considered both environmental factors and those aspects of social struc-
ture thought to determine health. For example, William Buchan, in Domestic
Medicine (1769), after defining a healthy body as one which interacts well with
the surrounding environment, adds a chapter where he describes how the poor
can improve their diet. Meanwhile, in Samuel-Auguste Tissot’sA Treatise on the
Diseases Incident to Literary and Sedentary Persons (1772), the idea of living as
close as possible to nature becomes a critique of city luxuries, and an occasion
to underline the importance of a natural diet that avoids artificiality.
Since Gentilcore aims to stress the shift in the nature of dietary advice from
the middle of the Eighteenth Century, the changes that transformed diet from
being a personal concern to a public health issue would have benefited from a
more thorough analysis. Even acknowledging the author’s view that a medi-
calization of the society was especially felt during the Enlightenment, and that
it was from that period that diets for all ranks of society started to appear, it
would have been interesting, for example, to know if the utopian texts of the
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Renaissance or the discussion of the health of the body politic among the early
members of the Royal Society had had any influence.
In the second part, Gentilcore looks at how food perception and practices
were shaped by social factors and how they interacted with medical theories.
Chapter three discusses the ruling elites’s inclination to define the eating
styles of different social groups. The Galenic assumption that everyone should
eat according to his own complexio was then used to justify why the delicate
constitution of noblemen could not digest those foods considered edible only
by the strong, hot stomachs of rustics and manual labourers. This medical idea
about class persisted evenwhen chemical andmechanical theories contradicted
the Galenic paradigm. As late as 1785, for example, Andrew Harper was still
suggesting that substantial meals be offered to poor children, to prevent their
stomachs from becoming too delicate.
Chapter four examines the link between food, human nature and nations.
The constitution—a term used both in political theory and physiology to de-
scribe the make-up of the body and how best to look after it—was, in Galenic
tradition, something that determined diet, which in turn, had a strong influence
on human nature. This resulted in the formation of national stereotypes, sup-
ported by the idea that the foods of one’s birth place are best. In 1642 we can
read in James Howell’s travel guide that the “humour of the people” is “patient
and industrious” (p. 88), where the “humour” is now used in a new sense, to
indicate people’s behaviour. Thus, people’s inclinations and personal tastes are
now influences over food choices and are seen as reflective of national char-
acteristics. This puts into question the influence of diet in establishing human
nature, an influence that, in Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia
(1787), is replaced by the idea of race.
The idea of asceticism, fasting and the religious calendar also influenced food
culture (chap. 5). In particular, Protestantism (and, by the sixteenth century, the
Counter-Reformation) had deep consequences in terms of attitudes towards
luxury and excessive mortification of the flesh. The message about modera-
tion was primarily religious, it was thought to purify the soul, but Gentilcore
underlines that it also had a practical medical sense. According to Galen, glut-
tony does not allow ‘concoction’ and non-digested food causes physical pain in
the body, and fumes that obfuscate the mind. Some radical Protestant groups,
such as the Ranters, moralized about meat consumption (chap. 6). The first
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vegetable-only dietary advice was probably written by the merchant Thomas
Tryon, once an apprentice hatter of an Anabaptist. For him, the path toward
spiritual progress consists of religious tolerance, non-violence towards animals
and simplicity. Though it may seem radical, Tryon was writing in 1691, when
increased fruit and vegetable consumption among the elites had already forced
physicians to adapt their advice (which had once looked down on these cold
and watery sources of nourishment). As for more vegetable-heavy diets and
abstinence, medical doctrines also have a small role in determining the assim-
ilation of the new foods brought into Europe in the Columbia exchange (chap.
7) and in shaping behaviours towards so-called “liquid food” (chap. 8).
While in the first part of the book the conservatism of the regimen comes
to light, in the second part another characteristic of dietary advice becomes
apparent, i.e. adaptability. This is to be understood in several different ways.
It is the adaptability of the author toward his readers (an idea that perhaps
should not just be read as the physician’s subservience to the evolving be-
haviours of the elites, but also in terms of a particular kind of relationship,
that of physician-patient), but it’s also the adaptability of a theory, in our case
the Galenic paradigm, to these changes of habits, whether they be habits that
are merely a fashion among the elites (such as the luxury of sorbetti and wine
with ice that soon become a way to delate corrupted humours), or practices in-
fluenced by geographical factors (i.e. English authors approved of potato con-
sumption, while physicians in Normandy promoted the benefits of cider).
Considering these undertones, the fact that one’s class, constitution and re-
ligion were more influential than the new medical theories or the availability
of new foods on diets don’t just give us the impression that food habits were
mainly determined by social factors to which medical discourse simply had to
adapt. It also shows that preventive medicine did not seek to determine every-
day life from above but to complement habits and suggest correctives of a social
and natural kind. This characteristic not only is explained in terms of cultural
or social history, but also by bearing in mind some specific features of medical
knowledge. Firstly, the importance given to practical effectiveness in defining
the success of any given medical doctrine. Secondly, the fact that preventive
medicine is the strand where medical knowledge is itself culture and politics,
where there is no sharp distinction between religious practice, power rituals
and remedies.
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On closer inspection, therefore, the angle of observation provided by dietary
advice allows us to bring medical practice and theory together, to show the
meeting point between different interlocutors (such as learned physicians and
those who enlivened courts or salons), and also grants an insight into the mean-
ing of health and the widespread interest in it among the non-medical commu-
nity (taking for example the extremely successful Della Vita sobria, written by
the nobleman Alvise Cornano in 1558).The aim of regimens was not merely the
absence of illness, or physical well-being, because health was also conceived as
the ability to lead a happier, more virtuous life. We may identify this broader
understanding of health as a sort of middle ground between medicine and phi-
losophy, one that may help us understand, as Shapiro¹ and Smith² have recently
done, the nexus between natural and moral philosophy. Even without ventur-
ing in that direction, Gentilcore highlights some interesting points, including
the past importance of knowing what is good for your body, the idea of be-
ing one’s own physician and allowing nature to run its course. Elsewhere he
muses about how diets were tailored to specific profession such as magistrates
or scholars, with the aim of maintaining a clear mind predisposed to virtue (a
meaningful example of that tendency is provided by the famous physician and
philosopher Guglielmo Grataroli, whowrote: “orderlie diet quickeneth the spir-
its and reviveth the minde, making it more active and coragious to know and
practize vertuous operations”, p. 17).
With skillful touch Gentilcore tackles the many themes involved in the di-
etary questions of the early modern period and shows how these were impor-
tant facets of the so-called ars vivendi. Food and Health in Early Modern Europe
bears testimony both to the intricate connection between various disciplines
and to the specific nature of the ideas behind early preventive medicine, where
moral, social and natural aspects defined the body and the act of nutrition at
one and the same time.
Lucia Randone
¹ L. Shapiro, “Descartes on Human Nature and the Human Good”, in The Rationalists: Between
Tradition and Innovation, ed. C. Fraenkel, D. Perinetti, J.E.H. Smith (Dordrecht & Boston: Springer,
2010), 13-26.
² J.E.H. Smith, “Diet, embodiment, and virtue in the mechanical philosophy”, Studies in History and
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43, (2012): 338–348.
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3 Richard Whatmore,What is Intellectual History?, Cambridge, UK -Mal-den, MA: Polity, 2016, p. 138. ISBN 9780745644929, HC £45.00, PB £14.99.InWhat is Intellectual History? Richard Whatmore, professor of modern his-tory at the University of St Andrews, presents one particularly influential vi-
sion of what intellectual history ought to be.Quoting John Burrow, Whatmore
presents the field as recovering “what people in the past meant by the things
they said and what these things ‘meant’ to them” (p. 13). Above everything
else, intellectual history attempts to understand past thinkers in their histori-
cal contexts. Although the present-day relevance of historical actors’ thoughts
is relevant for the inquiry, it is the intentions behind their writings, the his-
torical influences that informed them, and the contemporary reception of their
thoughts that helps the intellectual historian to reach a meaningful interpre-
tation. Here, the intellectual historian ties to avoid teleological interpretations
and is also open for unintended consequences of the actions and ideas of past
agents. All this also includes trying to understand the potentially disturbing
philosophies of the past in their own right and acknowledging the inconsis-
tencies in the thought of historical agents. Quentin Skinner famously talked of
“seeing things their way”, whereas another giant of historical theory, Reinhart
Koselleck, talked about “the veto right of the sources”. Whatmore’s preferred
metaphors are more flexible. He quotes John Burrow again and talks of the in-
tellectual historian as an eavesdropper of past conversations and a translator
between historical societies and our own time.
The book provides a condensed introduction to what intellectual history is
and is not, the history of the field, the methods of intellectual history, how some
particularly influential studies go about in doing intellectual history, what the
justifications for doing intellectual history are, and which types of debates are
central to the field at the present. While most of the book concentrates on a
British tradition, specifically the so-called Cambridge school, the chapter on
the history of intellectual history stands out since it deploys a much broader
definition of intellectual history. In this chapter Whatmore shortly engages in
the historical semantics of “intellectual history” and “history of ideas” as well as
the institutional history of the field. To anyone reading the text, it is clear that
the people like Johan Nordström, Arthur Lovejoy, Reinhart Koselleck, Michel
Foucault, Leo Strauss, Franco Venturi, and the two key figures of the Cambridge
school, John Pocock and Quentin Skinner do not form a coherent school of
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thought in any meaningful way, but they can all be associated with intellectual
history. A comparison of their work is very useful for any student of intellec-
tual history. (The inclusion of Strauss is the only surprise in this sense, as the
Straussian approach is very far from the one that Whatmore advocates in the
rest of the book.)
Their relationship to intellectual history also differs. Nordström was the first
professor of the history of ideas and learning in Sweden, and founded a learned
society in the field as well as Lychnos, apparently the first academic journal
devoted to the history of ideas. Similarly, Lovejoy, a philosopher by training,
founded the Journal of the History of Ideas which has been published since 1940.
For both of them, branding themselves as historians of ideas, was central. This
was not the case for Koselleck, whose conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte)
was a conscious attempt to criticize Ideengeschichte associated with Friedrich
Meinecke (who is mentioned elsewhere in the book, but curiously not here).
Foucault, who was professor of the history of systems of thought, also relied on
the rather different labelling for his scholarship. Venturi, again, was a historian
who did influence a school of younger Italian scholars who chose to gather
under the label of intellectual history.
The labels are at the same time significant and not. For the student searching
for inspiration the labels ought not to stay in the way, but for the historian
trying to understand the predicaments of these people and the different regional
and national contexts in which they formed their academic milieus, the labels
are crucial. For instance, the Swedish early institutionalization of the history of
ideas and learning created a discipline that was and is clearly separated from
history. This certainly still affects how academics perceive themselves. It may
also be a reason for the somewhat reluctant reception of the Cambridge school
in Sweden compared to neighboring Denmark and Finland.Whatmore does not
pay much attention to differences in the national academic traditions since he
is mostly preoccupied with the British case.
In the chapters on method, practice, justification, and present-day debates,
the examples get narrowed down and are almost exclusively from historians
active in Britain. Most examples deal with the history of political thought in
the early modern period or the eighteenth century. Focusing on the scholarship
that the author knows best has its obvious downsides for the student searching
for a general introduction to intellectual history – if they want to learn about
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Foucault, Venturi, Meinecke or Koselleck they need to go elsewhere – but the
benefit of writing about the influential scholars that Whatmore is more familiar
with is evident. Familiarity is in this case not limited to knowing the work of
people like John Dunn, John Pocock,Quentin Skinner, and István Hont, but the
text comes very close to these authors in another sense.WhenWhatmorewrites
about method and recapitulates parts of Skinner’s methodological writings, he
does not quote Skinner at length and conduct an exegesis of Skinners thought.
For the reader it feels that he rather writes from a tradition inwhich a number of
academics (mostly with a connection to Cambridge) have been discussing the
work of Skinner and others in so many different occasions that the methods
and theoretical points of the so-called Cambridge school have become a living
practice in which the original foundational texts such as Skinner’s “Meaning
and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) are central, but not the whole
story. For the outsider reader, it is almost like being an eavesdropper in the
seminars in Cambridge, Sussex or Whatmore’s St. Andrews. It is this personal
take on intellectual history that makes Whatmore’s book not only valuable to
undergraduate students, but also academics in the field.
One outcome of the personal take is that the book does not study the men-
tioned key figures as academics taking part in debates, that is, as the objects of
an intellectual history, but extracts models and examples from them for future
intellectual historians to follow and develop further. This may also be a ques-
tion of generation, Whatmore treats people like Herbert Butterfield or Arthur
Lovejoy as deeply embedded in their particular historical contexts, whereas the
generation active from the 1960s onwards is not given this treatment. Interest-
ingly, it is not Skinner or Pocock that gets the most venerate treatment, but are
at times criticized by Whatmore, but István Hont, whose work is presented in
the section that discusses the motivation for doing intellectual history. Hont’s
attempt to capture in Hume and Smith a sophisticated way of understanding
the interdependence of politics and economy that is relevant also for today’s
political thought is clearly also what motivates Whatmore’s presentation of in-
tellectual history. It is also in the case of Hont, that Whatmore comes to discuss
ideas from an interdisciplinary perspective. In this case economic and political
thought are necessarily seen as interwoven, but the links to religious thought
and scientific developments are also put to the fore.
One particularly interesting section in the book deals with how Pocock and
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Skinner have rather similar takes on historical study, which is one reason to
talk about a Cambridge school, but at the same time their interpretations on
republican thought differ to a large extent (p. 61). This has naturally been the
object of much debate and criticism. While the disagreements are nothing sur-
prising, the different normative arguments that Pocock and Skinner have made
over the years are slightly more difficult for Whatmore to explain. He seems
rather content with Pocock, the “liberal Eurosceptic intellectual” (p. 81), and
more skeptical to Skinner’s Neo-Roman intervention to politics. Overall, the is-
sue of normative outcomes of contextual intellectual history could have been
discussed further. Intellectual history’s relevance is partly about its relevance
for today, and at the same time the search for relevance often makes poor intel-
lectual history. It is not necessarily the case that strong normative claims result
in ahistorical postulations of analytical categories in the past, but also in the
cases in which Whatmore discusses normativity critically, this is often where
the problem lies. Why is that?
In the past years the practice of intellectual has been confronted by two con-
temporary trends, the need to move to an international or global perspective
and the possibilities of new methods for analyzing the constantly increasing
masses of digitized texts. Whatmore shortly addresses the former, but not the
latter. Although Whatmore chooses not to speculate, it is clear that the issues
he does bring forward will continue to be under constant negotiation also in
the near future. One of the key debates in intellectual history has to do with
defining the debates or contexts in which past thinkers operated. Skinner and
Pocock think differently regarding this, and Jo Guldi and David Armitage have
in their History Manifesto (2014) forced us to think anew by arguing for a much
broader serial contextualization. The promise of large scale digital corpora has
to do with better tools for analyzing precisely the different debates in which
past thinkers participated. Right now, it seems like it is not Skinner, but rather
Pocock, Hont and perhaps also Koselleck, who are becoming more relevant due
to new digitized practices of doing intellectual history.
Jani Pekka Marjanen
Book Reviews and Notices 5 : 13
4 Thomas A. Apel, Feverish Bodies, EnlightenedMinds: Science and the Yel-low Fever Controversy in the Early American Republic, Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2016, p. 191. ISBN 9780804797405, $60.00.Thomas Apel’s book aims at a fully-blown explanation of how the debates
on the cause of yellow fevers that took place during the last decade of the 18ᵗʰ
century, were influenced by the mindset of early American physicians and in-
tellectuals, and how they, in turn, impacted on society and the public sphere.
The author’s methodology hinges on a conscious assumption of an interdis-
ciplinary perspective, which is supposed to broaden our interpretation of the
medical controversy on yellow fevers by considering its theological, political
and philosophical implications.This method of inquiry undergirds Apel’s claim
of novelty for his study, as opposed to previous accounts of the topic, that fo-
cused on particular figures involved in the controversy or on specific aspects of
the debate.
The conundrum faced by the doctors working in the newborn American Re-
public revolved around the cause of a series of outbreaks of yellow fever that
ravaged seaport towns from 1793 to 1805. During the same period several cases
of yellow fever were also recorded in theWest Indies, where Britain and France
were at war in consequence of an anti-slavery uprising, eventually resulting in
the establishment of Haiti as an independent nation. Therefore, many believed
that the cause of fevers was to be found in some material elements that affected
bodies by contagion, as many French refugees fled the West Indies and came to
the United States, and several American ships travelled to Saint-Domingue and
imported goods such as coffee and sugar. The account of those who were called
“contagionists” was opposed by the “localists”, who contended that the cause of
the disease ought to be looked for in agents that originated in the same places
where fevers broke out. Especially, they believed that miasmas emanating from
putrid matter had noxious effects on humans and provoked the mortal illness
that tormented American families during the hot seasons of those years. When
epidemics stopped plaguing American seaboards, the explanations of the local-
ists was deemed true by most of those that took issue with them earlier on.
Nowadays, we know that the yellow fevers’ vectors are the mosquitos called
Aedes Aegypti, that in the 1790s were carried on American ships coming from
the West Indies and thrived as a result of the hot and rainy weather of North-
Eastern American shores in the summertime. Thus, the right explanation as to
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why America suffered from subsequent waves of epidemics in the late 18ᵗʰ cen-
tury lies in a middle ground between the account of the localists and that of the
contagionists.
Probably the most prominent spokesman of the localists, Benjamin Rush was
the physician who signed the Declaration and taught at the University of Penn-
sylvania for several years. As regards the debate on fevers, his argument rested
on the evidence that the disease was endemic to big cities and occurred un-
der specific environmental circumstances. As for the ultimate cause of fevers,
Rush surmised that it could be sought in an excess of oxygen in the atmosphere,
that would make marshes’ miasmas noxious. Also wholeheartedly supporting
chemical investigations, Samuel Latham Mitchill, professor at Columbia Col-
lege, claimed that the cause of yellow fevers was a gas, that he termed “septon”,
resulting from a particular combination of nitrogen and oxygen, that today is
called nitric oxide. However, neither Rush norMitchill could offer any empirical
proof for their chemical doctrines, and Apel insists on the relevance of specula-
tive reasoning for their explanations. This aspect sharply contrasted, according
to Apel, with the importance attached to experiments by Lavoisier and other
paramount French chemists. Chemistry, in the hands of American localists, pro-
vided a theoretical model that perfectly met their need to locate the cause of
fevers in the composition of the air, thereby countering the contagionists’ ac-
count, that apparently runs into a regress – for where and how did the infective
particles appear on the planet in the first place?
On the opposite side, contagionists likeWilliam Currie and Isaac Cathrall did
not exploit the language and the conceptual framework recently created by the
French chemists, and aimed at explanations more tightly related to empirical
evidence. However, they did not neglect the influence of the environment on the
activation of the material bearers of the disease, thus they never contradicted
theHippocratic philosophy, that insisted both on the observation of facts and on
the environmental conditions in which they are explored. Anatomy provided
them with a procedural scheme that would supposedly unseal the secrets of
naturewithout drifting towardsmetaphysical speculations. In order to rebut the
assumptions of the localists, the advocates of contagion stressed that outbreaks
did not occur in every part of the country where miasmas were produced by
dirt and filth; the only places where Americans witnessed the plague were port
cities, such as Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore and Norfolk. Therefore, they
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recommended that quarantine regulations were imposed on sea merchants and
sailors travelling on incoming ships.
On the contrary, localists insisted on cleanliness as a measure that ought
to be enforced in every bustling American town. The proposals for the imple-
mentation of severer sanitary strictures for big cities reflected extra-scientific
concerns of some physicians, who despised urban life, expressing a feeling com-
mon to many republicans. By detecting the material vehicle of fever in the filth
amassed in narrow and overcrowded American alleys and wharves, physicians
like Rush were also able to point out the moral cause of the disease, because
uncleanliness was considered a sin. If providence allowed epidemics to killed
many early Americans, this was the result of their lack of public virtue. Con-
sidering the political implications of the defense of either theory on the origin
of the plague, Apel stresses that even on the contagionists’ side one can detect
underlying extra-scientific reasons for defending this position. Colin Chisholm
was a Scotsman who served as a military surgeon before purchasing a cotton
plantation in Grenada, a small island in the Caribbean. His account of the origin
of the yellow fever in Africa was intended to discourage colonial enterprises on
Western African shores, fearing that it would favor abolitionism in the long
run. He thus attempted to safeguard the interests of West Indian planters by
attributing a remote origin of the epidemic.
A further element that characterized the debate about the cause of fevers that
unfolded during those years is the attempt to write disease histories. The lex-
icographer Noah Webster took a stance in favor of localism in a two-volume
history of the pestilences that plagued humanity during the course of past cen-
turies. The book was published in 1799 and analyzed the cause of the plague
of ancient Athens as described by Thucydides, alongside many other instances
of endemic diseases that ravaged empires, as the one that struck the Eastern
Roman Empire at the time of Justinian I, or more recent epidemics, like that of
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London during the year 1665. According to Webster, all previous outbreaks of
the diseases that he took into account resulted from specific conditions of the
air, which, under particular circumstances, displays an “epidemic constitution”
– a phrase meant to indicate what earlier physicians called “morbific matter”.
Also the contagionists sought to buttress their doctrines by looking at historical
records of past epidemics. James Tytler, for instance, believed that past occur-
rences of plagues and epidemic diseases shared a common nature, as they were
all caused by the same agents, that were transmitted from one population to
another. The ultimate cause of this chain of transmission was God – this way
Tytler responded to the accusation of running into a regress about the origin
of the contagious matter.
Most importantly, Apel explains that the success of the localists’ explanation
ultimately hinged on the fact that its theoretical and philosophical underpin-
nings jibed perfectly with Scottish Common Sense philosophy, that reflected
the mindset of early Americans better than alternative trends of thought – es-
pecially, deism, atheism and materialism. Physicians like Rush and Mitchill as-
sumed that man’s mind was equipped with an inborn apparatus, consisting in
trustworthy faculties, that were perfectly fit for understanding reality and its
divine origin. Many of the protagonists of the debate had studied in Scotland,
where Common Sense philosophy had become common currency afterThomas
Reid’s attack on Hume in 1764. The existence of God, the capacity of the under-
standing to grasp the causal structure of the world, and the trust in a benevo-
lent providence were all traits that, according to Apel, American intellectuals
drew from Reid and his closest followers, James Beattie and James Oswald. The
speculative orientation of many of the inquiries carried on by Rush, Mitchill,
Webster and their acolytes must be read on a par with the rationalistic leanings
of Common Sense philosophy. Conversely, the explanations elaborated by the
contagionists were unable to convince the public, as they did not provide com-
pelling reasons for believing in divine design and the rationality of all natural
phenomena. Despite this, the account based on contagion met the standard of
the experimental inquiry into reality that, as Apel contends, would eventually
lead to the discovery of the real cause of yellow fever through microbiological
studies.
The book is indeed well written and keeps the reader enthralled thanks to
its compelling narrative. However, some theoretical assumptions that guides
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Apel’s reconstruction of the controversy on yellow fever are somehowproblem-
atic. Firstly, the description of Common Sense philosophy as a form of thought
that encouraged analogical reasoning as opposed to experimental philosophy
is at least dubious, considering that Reid elaborated an articulated attack on
the use of analogies in scientific practices (see, for instance, T. Reid, Essays
on the Intellectual Powers, 1.4). Secondly, the assumption that Common Sense
warranted the study of causal powers in nature, as opposed to an empirical
description of phenomena, is also problematic, because Reid expressly distin-
guished the causal power of human free will from the constant conjunction of
any other series of events, describing natural causality in a strikingly Humean
fashion (see Essays on the Active Powers, 4.2). Also Apel’s personal evaluation
of the fever dispute could be called into question, if one did not accept some of
the theoretical premises on which it is based. In the last part of the book, the
contentious atmosphere that characterized the American public sphere in the
1790s is interpreted as the product of the failure of the Enlightenment in gen-
eral, on the basis of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of the Enlightenment.
Statements like thosewe find in the conclusion of the book—as for instance “The
Enlightenment created a monster” (p. 140)—seem to rely on a very specific un-
derstanding of the meaning of the period under discussion, that unfortunately
the author never fully articulates.
Sebastiano Gino
5 Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, Intersectionality, Cambridge,UK - Malden, MA: Polity, 2016, p. 250. ISBN: 9780745684482, HC £55.00,PB £15.99.The concept of ‘intersectionality’ has surfaced quite recently, although it was,
in a way, at the ready in all polemics against the idea that to some primary form
5 : 18 J. Regier, L. Randone, J. P. Marjanen, S. Gino, E. Pasini
of oppression all others ought to be reduced, be it class exploitation or women
subjugation. Kimberlé Crenshaw at UCLA Law School spotlighted in 1989 the
‘intersection of race and sex’, and later derived from that intuition an abstract
denomination. It is a two-faced notion: it is used as descriptive of a condition,
and also as prescriptive or methodological. Since it gives a name to an approach
critical of any unitary conception, it is always connected to some extent with
some kind of anti-essentialism. Strictly correlate, in fact, with the appreciation
of differences, the concept of ‘intersectionality’ hints to the fact that inequal-
ities are mostly compounded by multiple disadvantages, or multiple barriers
to empowerment, that are not considered as additive, rather as co-constitutive
and interacting. The concept has quickly autonomized from its feminist ori-
gins, and has eventually made it into the New Dictionary of the History of Ideas¹.
Indeed ‘intersectionality’ is an idea, and any theoretical, or practical and polit-
ical appreciation of an idea seems to call for a history of the inception, of the
spreading, and of debates on and use of the concept; having to do in this case
with such a recent conceptual innovation, in this book we find, alongside with a
systematic assessment of its object, also a sort of history of ideas practiced from
a very close vantage point. A similar effort by A. Vakulenko might be recalled²,
but on a much smaller scale.
From this point of view, which is of obvious interest to the readers of this
journal, chapter 3, “Getting the History of Intersectionality Straight?”, raises
some important questions, first of all by objecting vividly to any historiographic
obsession with “points of origin” and “key figures” (63). This is supported with
the following remarkable statement: “we take issue with this view that inter-
sectionality began when it was named” (64). This is relevant in itself, both as a
kind of ‘realist’ philosophy of history and as a historiographic stance, although
the authors point specifically to the risk of recasting “intersectionality as just
another academic field”. Given the present tendency to the infinite multiplica-
tion of academic fields, based on low-cost intersections of theoretic paradigms
¹ Maryanne Cline Horowitz, ed., New Dictionary of the History of Ideas (Detroit et al.: Thomson
Gale, 2005); see in part. Aída Hurtado and Jessica M. Roa, Chicana Feminisms, s.v. “Feminism”, at
p. 816-17, and Laura R. Woliver, s.v. “Political Protest, U.S.”, at p. 1838.
² Anastasia Vakulenko, “Gender and international human rights law: the intersectionality agenda”,
in Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth, eds., Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law,
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 196-214.
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from different or cognate disciplinary historiographies with some lacquer of
interdisciplinarity, it is clear that this restraint is good, both intellectually and
politically. Anyway, from this book, it emerges that attention to intersection-
ality would be advantageous to the historian at large and, by all means, to the
intellectual historian or the historian of ideas.
6 Jeffrey Weeks,What is Sexual History?, Cambridge, UK - Malden, MA:Polity, 2016, p. 180. ISBN: 978-0-7456-8024-8, HC £45.00, PB £14.99.In the series “What is History” where Richard Whatmore’s What is Intellec-tual History also appeared, this book offers, for ‘sexual history’, an introduction
in form, in turn, of a history. It is not in the unrelieved style of the familiar
history of historiography, rather it comes up with a sort of biography of the
discipline—given the author’s involvement with the discipline, we may say a
biography from within, or an authorized autobiography. Sexual history turns
out to be a history as much of sexual facts as of ideas on sexuality (often of the
former as they can be reconstructed from the latter), and it entails a fair lot of
intellectual history, as it mostly happens with stories of social and individual
practices. We are presented with its inception, for which the author send us
back to the medical creation of the vocabulary of sexuality in the 19ᵗʰ century.
Yet, just like in the preceding book I am reviewing here, there is a commitment
to the existence of reality/ies before ‘ideas’ and ‘names’, which is all but obvi-
ous when dealing with an object so integrated with social constructions.What
is Sexual History? offers an interesting reading to historians and intellectual
readers, both from a general point of view,and for appreciating the crossing of
different disciplinary methods in the study of any new historical object.
Enrico Pasini
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Annibale Carracci, Ragazzo che beve, usually dated 1680-85. It appears on the
cover of Gentilcore, Food and Health in Early Modern Europe.
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